



Danger Zone: Pure Storage, Inc. (PSTG)


Check out this week's [Danger Zone interview](#) with Chuck Jaffe of [Money Life](#) and Marketwatch.com

We focused on overvalued IPOs in 2015, including [Square](#) and [Planet Fitness](#). This week's Danger Zone hones in on another IPO from 2015 that may have been one of the last to capitalize on the easy money in the market. Post IPO, we believe it won't take long for investors to realize this company is bleeding cash, has no profits, and faces stiff competition moving forward. This week's Danger Zone is Pure Storage Inc. (PSTG: \$13/share).

Look Past Revenue, Search For Profits

While [many "unicorns" were debunked as myth in 2015](#), Pure Storage was able to avoid such scrutiny and went public on the strength of its revenue growth. Since 2013, Pure Storage has grown revenue by 436% compounded annually. It seems IPO investors chose to overlook the fact that profits have remained negative. Pure Storage's after-tax profit (NOPAT) has fallen from -\$77 million in 2014 to -\$179 million in 2015. Figure 1 shows the disconnect between revenue and profit.

Figure 1: Pure Storage's Increasing Losses



Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings

Pure Storage has the same problem as many overvalued startups: unsustainably high expenses. From 2012-2014, cost of revenues, research & development, sales & marketing, and general and administrative costs have risen 324%, 174%, 277%, and 301% compounded annually.

Unfortunately, dumping further capital into the business has been a poor investment. Pure Storage's return on invested capital (ROIC) has declined from -42% in 2014 to -72% in 2015. Worst of all, Pure Storage needed to IPO to continue operating, as its [free cash flow](#) reached -\$312 million (13% of market cap) in 2015.

Non-GAAP Metrics Are Frightfully Misleading

We've warned investors about the [accounting practices of IPO companies](#) as well as the over usage of [non-GAAP earnings](#), and Pure Storage raises lots of non-GAAP red flags. Pure Storage uses numerous non-GAAP measures to paint its business in a more positive light, as can be seen below.

1. Non-GAAP gross profit
2. Non-GAAP gross margin
3. Non-GAAP loss from operations
4. Non-GAAP operating margin
5. Non-GAAP net loss
6. Non-GAAP net loss per share

Like most companies using non-GAAP, Pure Storage excludes all sorts of operating expenses from these metrics; for example: stock-based compensation, assumed preferred stock conversion, and a one-time charge for an equity grant to the Pure Good Foundation. So how meaningful are these exclusions?

1. In 2014, Pure Storage removed \$21.6 million in stock based compensation, or 50% of revenue
2. In 2015, Pure Storage removed \$53 million in stock based compensation, or 30% of revenue

Even after removing these large expenses, Pure Storage is unable to turn a “profit”, GAAP or non-GAAP.

Competitive Market Diminishes Growth Prospects

Pure Storage faces enormous competition in the data storage market. This market includes large storage vendors such as EMC (EMC) and NetApp (NTAP), large companies acquiring similar technology such as HP (HPQ), IBM (IBM), Dell, and Lenovo, and new startup companies offering next generation storage solutions.

A relative latecomer to this market, Pure Storage lacks not only the resources of the larger incumbents but also lack their profitability. See Figure 2.

With so many offerings in the flash storage market , we think buyers will be very price sensitive, which makes Pure Storage’s deep level of unprofitability (ROIC of -72%) a major competitive disadvantage. How can it compete on price when it is losing so much money?

Figure 2: Pure Storage’s Poor Profitability

Company	Ticker	Return On Invested Capital
NetApp	NTAP	21%
EMC	EMC	12%
IBM	IBM	11%
HP	HPQ	9%
Pure Storage	PSTG	-72%

Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings

Bull Case Undermined By Competitor Strength

Pure Storage’s focus on all flash storage differs from competitors offerings, which still use hard disk based and hybrid storage. The bull case surrounding Pure Storage implies that not only are hard disk based storage solutions going to be ditched for flash, but that Pure Storage can take nearly all market share.

While Pure Storage touts that the enterprise storage market is estimated to reach \$27 billion by 2018, it fails to mention that in 2014, all flash array’s, which Pure Storage specializes in, only made up \$667 million of this entire market. The small size of the market notwithstanding, EMC has a large lead over Pure Storage, which means it will be rather difficult for Pure Storage to take majority share of that market.

In mid 2015, Gartner estimated that EMC had a 34% share of the all flash array market, more than that of Pure Storage and IBM combined, which placed #2 and #3 respectively. EMC’s success in this market, after acquiring ExtremelIO in 2012, further underscores its competitive strength. Moreover, because EMC operates other profitable business lines, it has more capital to invest in this market. It also has greater distribution as it reported cumulative sales passed \$1 billion in less than two years, something Pure Storage has failed to achieve since launching flash array in 2012. With EMC’s large existing customer base that can be upgraded to all flash array’s, Pure Storage faces an uphill battle in taking market share from EMC. Herein lies another big problem for PTSG. The current stock price implies that Pure Storage has not only won the battle, but already conquered the storage market all together.

Valuation Is Unrealistic With or Without Acquisition

Pure Storage IPO’d at \$17/share, and has already fallen well below this price. Despite this price decline, shares are still significantly overvalued. Even if Pure Storage achieves just 1% pre-tax margins (-103% in 2015), the company must still [grow revenue by 50% compounded annually for the next 14 years](#) to justify its current price. In this scenario, Pure Storage would be generating \$50.1 billion in revenue 14 years from now, which is slightly more than Cisco’s (CSCO) 2015 revenue and only \$4 billion less than Intel’s (INTC) 2014 revenue.

Even if we assume Pure Storage can achieve a 13% pre-tax margin (average of competition in Figure 2) and [can grow revenues by 30% compounded annually for the next decade](#), the stock is only worth \$10/share today – a 23% downside.

Could A Competitor Acquire Pure Storage?

As can happen in growing technology markets, large firms often acquire new technology rather than building it. Could acquisition hopes be driving Pure Storage's expensive share price? Let's take a look at stock through the lens of a potential acquirer.

Scenario 1: NetApp acquires Pure Storage. NTAP has the highest profitability of competition from Figure 2. Assuming upon acquisition Pure Storage immediately achieves NetApp's margins and ROIC, the company would still have to [grow revenue by 40% compounded annually for the next decade](#) to justify buying Pure Storage at its current price (~\$13/share). In this scenario, the value of Pure Storage's business based on the value of the firm if it achieves NTAP's 7% NOPAT margin in year 1 of the acquisition is still below \$0, due to the large value of preferred capital and outstanding employee stock options (more on this below).

Hidden Liabilities Make Buyout Even More Unlikely

Pure Storage has some hidden liabilities that make the company even more expensive the standard accounting numbers suggest and pull its valuation below the current \$13/share.

1. \$187 million in [outstanding employee stock options](#) (8% of market cap)
2. \$544 million in [preferred stock](#) (22% of market cap)
3. \$27 million in [off balance sheet operating leases](#) (1% of market cap)

Catalyst: Market Wakes Up To Reality

History shows that startup storage firms have a checkered history in the data storage market .

1. Violin Memory (VMEM) went public in in 2013 at \$9/share and currently trades for \$0.87/share, or 90% below IPO price.
2. Fusion-io, which went public in 2011 at \$19/share struggled to find a footing and was purchased by SanDisk (SNDK) for \$11.25 in 2014. This purchase price was 40% below IPO price and actually 21% more than the stock price at the time.
3. Nimble Storage (NMBL), which went public in 2013, has yet to turn a profit, and currently trades 64% below its IPO price of \$21/share.

With negative profitability and strong competitors, we wouldn't be surprised to see PSTG shares fall as soon as customer growth and revenues come in even slightly below expectations. With the quick success of EMC, this event could occur as soon as next quarter. However, much like the case of [Netflix](#) (NFLX), which trades solely on customer growth, if investors focus on a KPI unrelated to profits or the creation of shareholder value, it could take a few quarters before investors realize that Pure Storage business is not sustainable in its current form.

Executive Compensation Provides Little Accountability

Due to Pure Storage's designation as an "emerging growth company," it is not required to disclose details regarding its executive compensation. As it stands, executives receive bonuses based upon "company and individual goals." Unfortunately, these goals are not outlined in Pure Storage's S-1. If we were to make a recommendation, Pure Storage would be wise to adopt a plan that awards executives based upon meeting a target ROIC since ROIC has been [proven to be a driver of shareholder value creation](#).

Impact of Footnotes Adjustments and Forensic Accounting

We have made several adjustments to Pure Storage's S-1. The adjustments are:

Income Statement: we made \$4 million adjustments with a net effect of removing \$4 million (2% of revenue) million in non-operating expenses. We removed \$4 million in [non-operating expenses](#) and \$0 in [non-operating income](#).

Balance Sheet: we made \$105 million of balance sheet adjustments to calculate [invested capital](#) with a net decrease of \$39 million. The largest adjustment was the removal of \$27 million related to [operating leases](#). This adjustment represented 9% of reported net assets.



Valuation: we made \$758 million (31% of market cap) adjustments that all decrease shareholder value. There were no adjustments that increase shareholder value. The most notable adjustment to shareholder value was the removal of \$544 million due to [preferred stock](#). This adjustment represents 22% of Pure Storage's market cap.

Disclosure: David Trainer and Kyle Guske II receive no compensation to write about any specific stock, style, or theme.



New Constructs® – Profile

How New Constructs Creates Value for Clients

We find it. You benefit. Cutting-edge technology enables us to scale our [forensic accounting expertise](#) across 3000+ stocks. We shine a light in the dark corners of SEC filings so our clients can make safer, more informed decisions.

Our [stock rating methodology](#) instantly informs you of the quality of the business and the fairness of the stock's valuation. We do the diligence on earnings quality and valuation so you don't have to.

In-depth risk/reward analysis underpins our ratings. Our rating methodology grades every stock, ETF, and mutual fund according to what we believe are the 5 most important criteria for assessing the quality of an equity. Each grade reflects the balance of potential risk and reward of buying that equity. Our analysis results in the 5 ratings described below. Very Attractive and Attractive correspond to a "Buy" rating, Very Dangerous and Dangerous correspond to a "Sell" rating, while Neutral corresponds to a "Hold" rating.

QUESTION: Why shouldn't fund research be as good as stock research? Why should fund investors rely on backward-looking price trends?

ANSWER: They should not.

Don't judge a fund by its cover. Take a look inside at its holdings and understand the quality of earnings and valuation of the stocks it holds. We enable you to choose the best fund based on its stock-picking merits so you do not have to rely solely on backward-looking technical metrics.

The drivers of our [forward-looking fund ratings](#) are Portfolio Management (i.e. the aggregated ratings of its holdings) and Total Annual Costs. The Total Annual Costs Rating ([details here](#)) captures the all-in cost of being in a fund over a 3-year holding period, the average period for all fund investors.

Our Philosophy About Research

Accounting data is not designed for equity investors, but for debt investors. [Accounting data must be translated into economic earnings](#) to understand the profitability and valuation relevant to equity investors. Respected investors (e.g. Adam Smith, Warren Buffett and Ben Graham) have repeatedly emphasized that accounting results should not be used to value stocks. [Economic earnings](#) are what matter because they are:

1. Based on the complete set of financial information available.
2. Standard for all companies.
3. A more accurate representation of the true underlying cash flows of the business.

Additional Information

Incorporated in July 2002, [New Constructs](#) is an independent publisher of investment research that provides clients with consulting and research services. We specialize in quality-of-earnings, forensic accounting and discounted cash flow valuation analyses for all U.S. public companies. We translate accounting data from 10Ks into economic financial statements, i.e. [NOPAT](#), [Invested Capital](#), and [WACC](#), to create [economic earnings models](#), which are necessary to understand the true profitability and valuation of companies. Visit the [Free Archive](#) to download samples of our research. New Constructs is a [BBB accredited](#) business and a member of the [Investorside Research Association](#).

DISCLOSURES

New Constructs®, LLC (together with any subsidiaries and/or affiliates, "New Constructs") is an independent organization with no management ties to the companies it covers. None of the members of New Constructs' management team or the management team of any New Constructs' affiliate holds a seat on the Board of Directors of any of the companies New Constructs covers. New Constructs does not perform any investment or merchant banking functions and does not operate a trading desk.

New Constructs' Stock Ownership Policy prevents any of its employees or managers from engaging in Insider Trading and restricts any trading whereby an employee may exploit inside information regarding our stock research. In addition, employees and managers of the company are bound by a code of ethics that restricts them from purchasing or selling a security that they know or should have known was under consideration for inclusion in a New Constructs report nor may they purchase or sell a security for the first 15 days after New Constructs issues a report on that security.

New Constructs is affiliated with Novo Capital Management, LLC, the general partner of a hedge fund. At any particular time, New Constructs' research recommendations may not coincide with the hedge fund's holdings. However, in no event will the hedge fund receive any research information or recommendations in advance of the information that New Constructs provides to its other clients.

DISCLAIMERS

The information and opinions presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or solicitation of an offer to buy or sell securities or other financial instruments. New Constructs has not taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor and nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice. This report includes general information that does not take into account your individual circumstance, financial situation or needs, nor does it represent a personal recommendation to you. The investments or services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about any such investments or investment services.

Information and opinions presented in this report have been obtained or derived from sources believed by New Constructs to be reliable, but New Constructs makes no representation as to their accuracy, authority, usefulness, reliability, timeliness or completeness. New Constructs accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the information presented in this report, and New Constructs makes no warranty as to results that may be obtained from the information presented in this report. Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information and opinions contained in this report reflect a judgment at its original date of publication by New Constructs and are subject to change without notice. New Constructs may have issued, and may in the future issue, other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those reports reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them and New Constructs is under no obligation to insure that such other reports are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report.

New Constructs' reports are intended for distribution to its professional and institutional investor customers. Recipients who are not professionals or institutional investor customers of New Constructs should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to making any investment decision or for any necessary explanation of its contents.

This report is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would be subject New Constructs to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction.

This report may provide the addresses of websites. Except to the extent to which the report refers to New Constructs own website material, New Constructs has not reviewed the linked site and takes no responsibility for the content therein. Such address or hyperlink (including addresses or hyperlinks to New Constructs own website material) is provided solely for your convenience and the information and content of the linked site do not in any way form part of this report. Accessing such websites or following such hyperlink through this report shall be at your own risk.

All material in this report is the property of, and under copyright, of New Constructs. None of the contents, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way, copied, or distributed or transmitted to any other party without the prior express written consent of New Constructs. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or service marks of New Constructs.

Copyright New Constructs, LLC 2003 through the present date. All rights reserved.