




Salesforce.com Investors Lose Big In Demandware Acquisition

Under even the most optimistic integration scenarios, we believe that [Salesforce.com's](#) (CRM) proposed acquisition of [Demandware](#) (DWRE) for \$75/share or \$2.85 billion represents an unacceptable transfer of wealth from CRM to DWRE shareholders. As noted in prior reports, Demandware is far from profitable. Salesforce is not much better. Our models show that more than \$2 billion of the \$2.85 billion purchase is an overpayment and a direct destruction of value for CRM shareholders.

Salesforce Is Spending On A Profitless Business

Since going public, Demandware's operations have focused on revenue growth with no regard to the bottom line. The company's after-tax profit ([NOPAT](#)) has declined from -\$7 million in 2012 to -\$38 million in fiscal year 2015. Conversely, Demandware's revenue has grown from \$79 million in 2012 to \$254 million over the last twelve months (TTM), per Figure 1.

Figure 1: Demandware's Growing Losses



Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings

Acquisition Is A Misallocation Of Capital

In a nutshell, Salesforce is paying \$2.8 billion to acquire an unprofitable company (Demandware lost -\$38 million in NOPAT in the last twelve months). The deal generates an ROIC of -1%, which is lower than Salesforce's 2% ROIC and well below the company's 9% weighted average cost of capital ([WACC](#)). To justify paying \$75/share, Salesforce would need, at a minimum, Demandware's NOPAT (assuming no capex) to be \$257 million or 9% of the \$2.8 billion purchase price. At that level, the deal would earn Salesforce an ROIC equal to its WACC, which is still a low hurdle, but at least the deal would not destroy value.

How Much Is Salesforce Overpaying?

To get a sense of how much shareholder value Salesforce is destroying, let's look at some reasonable scenarios for how much the company can improve Demandware's business so that it generates some cash flow. First, we account for liabilities that investors may not be aware of that make DWRE more expensive than the accounting numbers would suggest.

1. \$68 million in [outstanding employee stock options](#) (4% of market cap prior to acquisition announcement)
2. \$31 million in [off-balance-sheet operating leases](#) (2% of market cap prior to acquisition announcement)

Next, Figures 2 and 3 show the implied stock prices that Salesforce should pay for DWRE to achieve a ROIC equal to its WACC, assuming different scenarios for revenue growth and NOPAT margins. In each of these scenarios, we conservatively assume that Salesforce can grow Demandware's revenue and NOPAT without

spending on working capital or fixed assets. In Figure 2, the revenue growth scenarios assume that upon acquisition, DWRE immediately achieves Salesforce's NOPAT margin of 2.1%. The current margin is -14.9%.

Figure 2: Implied Acquisition Prices For CRM To Achieve 9% ROIC with 2.1% NOPAT margin

To Earn 9% ROIC On Acquisition (2.1% Margins)			
Revenue Growth Scenario	Implied Stock Price	\$ Value Destroyed	\$/CRM Share Destroyed
30% CAGR for 5 years	\$6	(\$2,620)	(\$3.87)
40% CAGR for 5 years	\$8	(\$2,531)	(\$3.74)
50% CAGR for 5 years	\$11	(\$2,414)	(\$3.56)

Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings. \$ values in millions except per share amounts.

The big takeaway from Figure 2 is that even if Demandware grows revenue by 50% compounded annually for the next five years, the most Salesforce should pay to ensure an ROIC equal to WACC is \$11/share, or \$2.4 billion (85%) less than the proposed purchase price. For reference, Demandware grew revenue by 48% in 2015, and consensus estimates peg revenue growth at 28% in 2016.

Figure 3: Implied Acquisition Prices For CRM To Achieve 9% ROIC with 4.2% NOPAT margin

To Earn 9% ROIC on Acquisition (4.2% Margins)			
Revenue Growth Scenario	Implied Stock Price	\$ Value Destroyed	\$/CRM Share Destroyed
30% CAGR for 5 years	\$11	(\$2,423)	(\$3.58)
40% CAGR for 5 years	\$16	(\$2,246)	(\$3.32)
50% CAGR for 5 years	\$22	(\$2,011)	(\$2.97)

Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings. \$ values in millions except per share amounts.

In Figure 3, the revenue growth scenarios assume that upon acquisition, DWRE immediately achieves a 4.2% NOPAT margin, which is double CRM's TTM NOPAT margin. Even in this scenario, the most Salesforce should pay for DWRE is \$22/share, or 71% below the actual acquisition price.

In addition to significantly higher revenue growth expectations, both scenarios are made more optimistic by the high NOPAT margin estimates (DWRE's TTM NOPAT margin was -14.9%).

The bottom line is that Salesforce's management should have some explaining to do to justify this acquisition at \$75/share.

Implied Synergies Are Unreasonable

The only reason for a firm to pay a premium over the market value for another firm is if the acquiring firm believes there are significant synergies attainable through acquisition. As the deal is constructed, Salesforce is paying a premium of \$27.01/share (from 5/31/16 close price), or slightly over \$1 billion above market price. Salesforce has yet to make any mention of the dollar value of synergies between the two companies.

Conclusion

Until investors hold management accountable for intelligent capital allocation, they can expect companies to continue to destroy shareholder value without feeling any accountability to their investors. Given our analysis above, we think it fair to ask both management teams how this deal is fair to their investors. The answer for DWRE investors appears easy. The answer for CRM investors is not so easy.

This article originally published [here](#) on June 2, 2016.

Disclosure: David Trainer and Kyle Guske II receive no compensation to write about any specific stock, style, or theme.



New Constructs® – Profile

How New Constructs Creates Value for Clients

We find it. You benefit. Cutting-edge technology enables us to scale our [forensic accounting expertise](#) across 3000+ stocks. We shine a light in the dark corners of SEC filings so our clients can make safer, more informed decisions.

Our [stock rating methodology](#) instantly informs you of the quality of the business and the fairness of the stock's valuation. We do the diligence on earnings quality and valuation so you don't have to.

In-depth risk/reward analysis underpins our ratings. Our rating methodology grades every stock, ETF, and mutual fund according to what we believe are the 5 most important criteria for assessing the quality of an equity. Each grade reflects the balance of potential risk and reward of buying that equity. Our analysis results in the 5 ratings described below. Very Attractive and Attractive correspond to a "Buy" rating, Very Dangerous and Dangerous correspond to a "Sell" rating, while Neutral corresponds to a "Hold" rating.

QUESTION: Why shouldn't fund research be as good as stock research? Why should fund investors rely on backward-looking price trends?

ANSWER: They should not.

Don't judge a fund by its cover. Take a look inside at its holdings and understand the quality of earnings and valuation of the stocks it holds. We enable you to choose the best fund based on its stock-picking merits so you do not have to rely solely on backward-looking technical metrics.

The drivers of our [forward-looking fund ratings](#) are Portfolio Management (i.e. the aggregated ratings of its holdings) and Total Annual Costs. The Total Annual Costs Rating ([details here](#)) captures the all-in cost of being in a fund over a 3-year holding period, the average period for all fund investors.

Our Philosophy About Research

Accounting data is not designed for equity investors, but for debt investors. [Accounting data must be translated into economic earnings](#) to understand the profitability and valuation relevant to equity investors. Respected investors (e.g. Adam Smith, Warren Buffett and Ben Graham) have repeatedly emphasized that accounting results should not be used to value stocks. [Economic earnings](#) are what matter because they are:

1. Based on the complete set of financial information available.
2. Standard for all companies.
3. A more accurate representation of the true underlying cash flows of the business.

Additional Information

Incorporated in July 2002, [New Constructs](#) is an independent publisher of investment research that provides clients with consulting and research services. We specialize in quality-of-earnings, forensic accounting and discounted cash flow valuation analyses for all U.S. public companies. We translate accounting data from 10Ks into economic financial statements, i.e. [NOPAT](#), [Invested Capital](#), and [WACC](#), to create [economic earnings models](#), which are necessary to understand the true profitability and valuation of companies. Visit the [Free Archive](#) to download samples of our research. New Constructs is a [BBB accredited](#) business and a member of the [Investorside Research Association](#).



DISCLOSURES

New Constructs®, LLC (together with any subsidiaries and/or affiliates, "New Constructs") is an independent organization with no management ties to the companies it covers. None of the members of New Constructs' management team or the management team of any New Constructs' affiliate holds a seat on the Board of Directors of any of the companies New Constructs covers. New Constructs does not perform any investment or merchant banking functions and does not operate a trading desk.

New Constructs' Stock Ownership Policy prevents any of its employees or managers from engaging in Insider Trading and restricts any trading whereby an employee may exploit inside information regarding our stock research. In addition, employees and managers of the company are bound by a code of ethics that restricts them from purchasing or selling a security that they know or should have known was under consideration for inclusion in a New Constructs report nor may they purchase or sell a security for the first 15 days after New Constructs issues a report on that security.

DISCLAIMERS

The information and opinions presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or solicitation of an offer to buy or sell securities or other financial instruments. New Constructs has not taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor and nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice. This report includes general information that does not take into account your individual circumstance, financial situation or needs, nor does it represent a personal recommendation to you. The investments or services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about any such investments or investment services.

Information and opinions presented in this report have been obtained or derived from sources believed by New Constructs to be reliable, but New Constructs makes no representation as to their accuracy, authority, usefulness, reliability, timeliness or completeness. New Constructs accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the information presented in this report, and New Constructs makes no warranty as to results that may be obtained from the information presented in this report. Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information and opinions contained in this report reflect a judgment at its original date of publication by New Constructs and are subject to change without notice. New Constructs may have issued, and may in the future issue, other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those reports reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them and New Constructs is under no obligation to insure that such other reports are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report.

New Constructs' reports are intended for distribution to its professional and institutional investor customers. Recipients who are not professionals or institutional investor customers of New Constructs should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to making any investment decision or for any necessary explanation of its contents.

This report is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would be subject New Constructs to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction.

This report may provide the addresses of websites. Except to the extent to which the report refers to New Constructs own website material, New Constructs has not reviewed the linked site and takes no responsibility for the content therein. Such address or hyperlink (including addresses or hyperlinks to New Constructs own website material) is provided solely for your convenience and the information and content of the linked site do not in any way form part of this report. Accessing such websites or following such hyperlink through this report shall be at your own risk.

All material in this report is the property of, and under copyright, of New Constructs. None of the contents, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way, copied, or distributed or transmitted to any other party without the prior express written consent of New Constructs. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or service marks of New Constructs.

Copyright New Constructs, LLC 2003 through the present date. All rights reserved.