



## Does The RealReal (REAL) Have a Path to Profitability?

Luxury consignment marketplace The RealReal (REAL: \$17/share) IPO'd on June 28 at a price of \$20/share. The stock reached a high of \$28 on its first day of trading before steadily declining over the next two months to a low of \$13/share on August 27. Since then, REAL has rebounded by 33% to \$17/share.

This wild volatility reflects the key underlying question for REAL. Is it an innovative new business model that has found a profitable niche? Or is REAL, whose CEO previously ran Pets.com, destined to crash and burn in the same manner?

This report aims to help investors sort through REAL's financial filings to understand the fundamentals and valuation of this recent IPO.

Get the best fundamental research


### Filling an Underserved Niche

REAL operates an online marketplace that allows people to sell secondhand luxury goods such as designer clothing, jewelry, and art. In 2018, the company facilitated 1.6 million transactions with a total value of \$710 million from over 400 thousand different buyers.

Selling and buying secondhand luxury goods online presents a unique challenge due to the proliferation of knockoff goods. If, for instance, someone posts a Gucci handbag for sale on eBay (EBAY), it's difficult, if not impossible, for any potential buyers to verify its authenticity. As a result, buyers will not want to pay full price, which means sellers of authentic goods will not want to sell on the platform. This creates a negative feedback loop that results in the [majority of luxury goods posted on EBAY being fake](#).

REAL solves this problem by authenticating all the merchandise sold on its site and handling all elements of the sales process, including photography, pricing, fulfillment, and returns. This more intensive service allows REAL to retain a significant portion of the money buyers spend on its site. REAL's take rate, the percentage of each order that it keeps as a percent of revenue, was 36% in 2018. EBAY's take rate was just 9%, and craft goods marketplace Etsy's (ETSY) take rate was 15%, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Take Rate for REAL, ETSY, and EBAY for 2018



Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings



### High Cost Business Model

While REAL gets to keep a much larger portion of the money spent on its site than its peers, it also has to spend much more to earn that revenue. It pays the cost of authenticating, merchandising, shipping, and accepting returns for all the items it sells.


What’s more, many of the above costs are not reported in cost of goods sold. Instead, they are reported as “Operations and Technology” expenses. According to REAL’s S-1:

*“Operations and technology expense principally includes personnel-related costs for employees involved with the authentication, merchandising and fulfillment of goods sold through our online marketplace, as well as our general information technology expense.”*

We would argue that many of these costs are directly related to the delivery of REAL’s service and should be included in cost of revenue. By reporting these costs separately, REAL makes its gross margin look higher and presents a potentially misleading picture of its path to profitability.

Figure 2 shows that REAL’s gross margin has stayed consistent at ~65% since 2017. However, if we include operations and technology expense as part of cost of revenue, its “Adjusted Gross Margin” declined from 22% in 2017 to 15% TTM.

**Figure 2: REAL Gross Margin and Adjusted Gross Margin: 2017-TTM**



Sources: New Constructs, LLC and company filings

REAL says that it expects operations and technology expenses to decrease as a percentage of revenue over the longer term, but Figure 2 shows that they’re currently not making any progress towards that goal.

Overall, REAL’s after-tax operating (NOPAT) decreased from -\$47 million in 2017 to -\$66 million in 2018, but its NOPAT margin improved slightly from -35% to -32% over the same time.

REAL seems like it should have a profitable business model. It fulfills an underserved niche and has relatively little direct competition. However, the company has yet to show significant concrete progress towards achieving profitability.

It’s possible that this business is simply not a profitable space, which would explain why so few other firms have filled this niche.

### Could REAL Benefit from a Recession?

While luxury goods manufacturers struggle during economic downturns, REAL’s consignment business could actually benefit from poor economic conditions. Shoppers that normally buy new luxury items might substitute and buy used during a recession. At the same time, the company could also get a large influx of new sellers needing extra cash as well.



Of course, it's also possible that the overall decline in spending on luxury goods during a recession would more than offset this substitution effect and be a net negative for REAL. As with so many other recent IPO's, we've never seen this company operate during an economic downturn, so we have no real idea how it will perform. Still, there's at least some reason for investors to hope that this company is better equipped to handle a recession.

### **Public Shareholders Have Rights – A Break from Recent Norms**

REAL's corporate governance also separates it from many other recent IPO's. While most companies now go public with [dual-class](#) share structures that give insiders and early investors extra voting rights, REAL has just a single class of voting stock. Public shareholders get to have an equal voice in corporate governance.

This voting power is especially important because shareholders have reason to be skeptical of REAL's leadership. Founder and CEO Julie Wainwright first rose to prominence as the CEO of Pets.com, the ill-fated e-commerce company that became the poster child of tech bubble excess in the late-90's.

Wainwright's resume won't give investors much confidence, but at least shareholders have the power to potentially replace her if REAL doesn't start showing signs of profitability.

### **DCF Model Reveals High Expectations**

When we use our [dynamic DCF](#) model to analyze the future cash flow expectations baked into the current stock price, we see that REAL is expensive, but still has potential upside.

To justify its current valuation of \$17/share, REAL must achieve 12% NOPAT margins (comparable to ETSY) and grow revenue by 23% compounded annually for the next eight years. [See the math behind this dynamic DCF scenario.](#)

If REAL can grow revenue at the same rate but achieve NOPAT margins of 19% (equal to EBAY), the stock is worth \$30/share today, a 73% upside to the current stock price. [See the math behind this dynamic DCF scenario.](#)

A 23% compound annual growth rate seems very achievable for a company that grew revenue by 50% year-over-year through the first six months of 2019, so the issue is margins. Given the high take rate, REAL should be able to achieve comparable margins to its peers (with some cost controls), in which case the stock is undervalued. However, the poor performance of the stock since its IPO shows that investors are not satisfied with future promises and want to see progress towards profitability right now.

### **Critical Details Found in Financial Filings by Our [Robo-Analyst Technology](#)**

As investors [focus more](#) on fundamental research, research automation technology is needed to analyze all the critical financial [details in financial filings](#). Below are specifics on the adjustments we make based on Robo-Analyst<sup>1</sup> findings in The RealReal's S-1:

Income Statement: we made \$11 million of adjustments, with a net effect of removing \$9 million in [non-operating expense](#) (4% of revenue). You can see all the adjustments made to REAL's income statement [here](#).

Balance Sheet: we made \$124 million of adjustments to calculate invested capital with a net increase of \$82 million. The most notable adjustment was \$96 million in [operating leases](#). This adjustment represented 204% of reported net assets. While most companies are now required to [report operating leases on the balance sheet](#), REAL is classified as an emerging growth company and can delay its adoption of the new standard until 2020. You can see all the adjustments made to REAL's balance sheet [here](#).

Valuation: we made \$227 million of adjustments with a net effect of decreasing shareholder value by \$227 million. You can see all the adjustments made to REAL's valuation [here](#).

*This article originally published on [September 17, 2019](#).*

*Disclosure: David Trainer, Kyle Guske II, and Sam McBride receive no compensation to write about any specific stock, style, or theme.*

*Follow us on [Twitter](#), [Facebook](#), [LinkedIn](#), and [StockTwits](#) for real-time alerts on all our research.*

<sup>1</sup> Harvard Business School Features the powerful impact of research automation in the case study [New Constructs: Disrupting Fundamental Analysis with Robo-Analysis](#).



## ***New Constructs® - Research to Fulfill the Fiduciary Duty of Care***

---

Ratings & screeners on 3000 stocks, 450 ETFs and 7000 mutual funds help you make prudent investment decisions.

New Constructs leverages the latest in machine learning to analyze structured and unstructured financial data with unrivaled speed and accuracy. The firm's forensic accounting experts work alongside engineers to develop proprietary NLP libraries and financial models. Our investment ratings are based on the best fundamental data in the business for stocks, ETFs and mutual funds. Clients include many of the top hedge funds, mutual funds and wealth management firms. David Trainer, the firm's CEO, is regularly featured in the media as a thought leader on the fiduciary duty of care, earnings quality, valuation and investment strategy.

### ***To fulfill the Duty of Care, research should be:***

1. **Comprehensive** - All relevant publicly-available (e.g. 10-Ks and 10-Qs) information has been diligently reviewed, including footnotes and the management discussion & analysis (MD&A).
2. **Un-conflicted** - Clients deserve unbiased research.
3. **Transparent** - Advisors should be able to show how the analysis was performed and the data behind it.
4. **Relevant** - Empirical evidence must provide [tangible, quantifiable correlation](#) to stock, ETF or mutual fund performance.

### ***Value Investing 2.0: Diligence Matters: Technology is Key to Value Investing With Scale***

Accounting data is only the beginning of fundamental research. It must be translated into economic earnings to truly understand profitability and valuation. This translation requires deep analysis of footnotes and the MD&A, a process that our [robo-analyst technology](#) empowers us to perform for thousands of stocks, ETFs and mutual funds.



## **DISCLOSURES**

---

New Constructs®, LLC (together with any subsidiaries and/or affiliates, "New Constructs") is an independent organization with no management ties to the companies it covers. None of the members of New Constructs' management team or the management team of any New Constructs' affiliate holds a seat on the Board of Directors of any of the companies New Constructs covers. New Constructs does not perform any investment or merchant banking functions and does not operate a trading desk.

New Constructs' Stock Ownership Policy prevents any of its employees or managers from engaging in Insider Trading and restricts any trading whereby an employee may exploit inside information regarding our stock research. In addition, employees and managers of the company are bound by a code of ethics that restricts them from purchasing or selling a security that they know or should have known was under consideration for inclusion in a New Constructs report nor may they purchase or sell a security for the first 15 days after New Constructs issues a report on that security.

## **DISCLAIMERS**

---

The information and opinions presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or solicitation of an offer to buy or sell securities or other financial instruments. New Constructs has not taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor and nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice. This report includes general information that does not take into account your individual circumstance, financial situation or needs, nor does it represent a personal recommendation to you. The investments or services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about any such investments or investment services.

Information and opinions presented in this report have been obtained or derived from sources believed by New Constructs to be reliable, but New Constructs makes no representation as to their accuracy, authority, usefulness, reliability, timeliness or completeness. New Constructs accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the information presented in this report, and New Constructs makes no warranty as to results that may be obtained from the information presented in this report. Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information and opinions contained in this report reflect a judgment at its original date of publication by New Constructs and are subject to change without notice. New Constructs may have issued, and may in the future issue, other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those reports reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them and New Constructs is under no obligation to insure that such other reports are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report.

New Constructs' reports are intended for distribution to its professional and institutional investor customers. Recipients who are not professionals or institutional investor customers of New Constructs should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to making any investment decision or for any necessary explanation of its contents.

This report is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would be subject New Constructs to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction.

This report may provide the addresses of websites. Except to the extent to which the report refers to New Constructs own website material, New Constructs has not reviewed the linked site and takes no responsibility for the content therein. Such address or hyperlink (including addresses or hyperlinks to New Constructs own website material) is provided solely for your convenience and the information and content of the linked site do not in any way form part of this report. Accessing such websites or following such hyperlink through this report shall be at your own risk.

All material in this report is the property of, and under copyright, of New Constructs. None of the contents, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way, copied, or distributed or transmitted to any other party without the prior express written consent of New Constructs. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or service marks of New Constructs. Copyright New Constructs, LLC 2003 through the present date. All rights reserved.